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Abstract 
We analyze how a contest organizer chooses the winner when the contestants.efforts are already 
exerted and commitment to the use of a given contest success function is not possible. We 
define the notion of rationalizability in mixed-strategies to capture such a situation. Our 
approach allows to derive different contest success functions depending on the aims and 
attitudes of the decider. We derive contest success functions which are closely related to 
commonly used functions providing new support for them. By taking into account social 
welfare considerations our approach bridges the contest literature and the recent literature on 
political economy. 
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1 Introduction
In a contest players exert e¤ort in order to win a certain prize. Contests have been used to
analyze a variety of strategic situations ranging from rent-seeking and lobbying to conict, arms
races, warfare, and promotional e¤orts, as well as to sports.1
In many of these situations there is a contest organizer who awards the prize.2 For example
in litigation a court decides on the winner; in lobbying, rent-seeking and rent-defending contests
bureaucrats or politicians award a prize; in internal labor market tournaments jobs are allocated
by the manager of an organization; or in beauty contests the decision where to locate an event
is taken by a committee.
A crucial determinant for the equilibrium predictions of contests is the specication of the
so-called contest success function (CSF) which relates the playerse¤orts and win probabilities
(also interpreted as shares of the prize).3 In this paper we provide a framework in which
CSFs are derived as an optimal choice of the contest administrator.4 See our remarks in the
nal section regarding the interpretation of our results when the contest is not organized by
a contest administrator. The administrator is unable to commit to a CSF so she chooses the
probabilities with which the prize is given in order to maximize her utility given the choices
of the contestants. Assuming complete information, contestants anticipate the choice made by
the contest organizer. We apply this framework by postulating di¤erent utility functions for
the decider. Of course the plausibility of our results hinges on the plausibility of these utility
functions. Thus we decide to use only the most popular utility functions in the theory under
risk: expected utility and (a special case of) prospect theory. We also follow the recent political
economy literature (see Grossman and Helpman, 2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2000) and let
the decider care about social welfare - albeit in contrast to that literature in the form of a
generalized utilitarian planner. Somewhat surprisingly, this allows us to derive the three most
commonly used types of CSFs: non-deterministic CSFs with an additive structure (Proposition
5), deterministic CSFs (Proposition 4 and Example 1) and di¤erence-form CSFs (Propositions
1, 2 and 3).
Our approach di¤ers from other models in which commitment is possible such as the menu
auction approach (see Grossman and Helpman, 1994). Dasgupta and Nti (1998) analyzed the
optimal design of a contest when the contestants have identical valuations, the planner might
retain the prize and when the contest success function must be of the class axiomatized by
Skaperdas (1996) (see equation (2) below). They nd that, when the planner has a low valuation
1For a survey see Konrad (2007).
2We use the terms contest administrator, contest organizer, decider and planner interchangeably. Participants
in the contest are called contestants, rent seekers or contenders.
3A prominent example of this interpretation as shares is Wärneryd (1998). He analyzes a contest among
jurisdictions for shares of the GNP and compares di¤erent types of jurisdictional organization.
4Other alternative foundations for CSFs are provided by Blavatskyy (2008), Münster (2009) and Rai and Sarin
(2009) who o¤er axiomatic characterizations of contest success functions following the seminal paper by Skaperdas
(1996). The earlier work on foundations for contest success functions has been extensively reviewed by Konrad
(2007).
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for the prize, the optimal CSF is such that the probability that a contestant obtains the prize is
the ratio of her e¤ort with respect to total e¤ort. A closely related paper is Epstein and Nitzan
(2006) which with respect to commitment can be seen as the benchmark that is the opposite of
our paper. In Epstein and Nitzan the contest organizer decides rst whether to have a contest
at all, and if a contest takes place, she chooses the CSF among the elements of a xed set of
CSFs maximizing ex-ante utility. In doing so, the organizer anticipates the equilibrium e¤orts of
contestants and needs to be able to commit to employing a given CSF once e¤orts are exerted.
In contrast, in our approach the organizer decides on the winner once e¤orts are exerted.5 There
are further approaches motivating or endogenizing the CSF and some of them imply that it is
not necessary to assume commitment. In one recent approach contestants might be uncertain
about a characteristic of the organizer and as a result view the determination of the winner as
probabilistic although the organizer chooses in a deterministic way (Corchón and Dahm, 2009;
Skaperdas and Vaidya, 2009). In another, e¤orts are a¤ected by exogenous shocks so that the
performance of contestants is di¤erent from e¤orts which generates randomness from the point
of view of contestants (Jia 2007).
Our approach cannot be construed as criticism of the commitment assumption. The com-
mitment case is an important benchmark case. It is, however, not always clear how the decider
can be trusted to maintain her word. In other cases the planner may prefer a policy of wait and
see instead of announcing a certain CSF. Therefore, it is important to know what happens when,
after contestants have exerted e¤orts, the contest administrator is no longer constrained by her
word and could choose the winner in a di¤erent way. Thus our paper can be viewed as a check
on the properties of CSFs in case commitment becomes unlikely. Our main conclusion is that
well-known CSFs arise under natural specications of the preferences of the contest organizer.
Thus our approach could be considered as a back up for the use of well-known CSFs.
2 Preliminaries
A contest administrator conducts a contest among n contestants denoted by i 2 N := f1; :::; ng.
Each contestant has a valuation for the prize, denoted by Vi 2 R+, and exerts e¤ort Gi 2 R+
in order to a¤ect the probability of winning the prize which is given by the CSF.
Formally, a contest success function p(G) = (p1(G); p2(G):::; pn(G)) associates, to each
vector of e¤orts G, a lottery specifying for each agent a probability pi of getting the prize. That
is, pi = pi(G) is such that, for each contestant i 2 N , pi(G)  0, and
Pn
i=1 pi (G) = 1.
We say that a CSF is imperfectly discriminating if Gi > 0 implies that pi(G) > 0.6 An
5There are further di¤erences to our paper. In our approach the contest organizer is completely unconstrained
in her choice of the contest success function, rather than choosing among the elements of a xed set of contest
success functions. Also, our approach is not restricted to the case of two contestants.
6This is essentially axiom 1 in Skaperdas (1996). The name of this property refers to the fact that a contest
can be interpreted as an auction where the prize is auctioned among the agents and e¤orts are bids. In standard
auctions the highest bid obtains the prize with probability one. Here, any positive bid entitles the bidder with
a positive probability to obtain the object, so it is as if the bidding mechanism did not discriminate perfectly
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example for such a function is the most commonly used CSF introduced by Tullock (1980)
which is given by
pi =
GRiPn
j=1G
R
j
; for i = 1; :::; n; (1)
where R is a positive parameter. A generalization of this form is
pi =
fi(Gi)Pn
j=1 fj(Gj)
; for i = 1; :::; n; (2)
where the fi() are positive increasing functions of its argument. For the case in which fi() = f()
for i = 1; :::; n, (2) has been axiomatized by Skaperdas (1996). A di¤erent class of CSFs are
di¤erence-forms (Hirshleifer, 1989; Baik, 1998; Che and Gale; 2000). The linear di¤erence-form
contest in Che and Gale (2000) is dened as
pi = max

min

1
2
+ s(Gi  Gj); 1

; 0

for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i, (3)
where s is a positive scalar. Notice that the linear di¤erence-form is not imperfectly discrim-
inating. Another example for a not imperfectly discriminating CSF is a function that assigns
probability one to the contestant exerting the highest e¤ort, like in an all-pay auction.
Contestants are risk-neutral. Dening ai(G) = 1 when the contest is all-pay (e¤ort is
irreversible so that all contestants pay their bid) and ai(G) = pi(G) when the contest is winner-
pay (e¤ort is like a promise so that only the winner pays his bid), the expected utility of a
contestant is
ui(pi;G) = pi(G)Vi   ai(G)Gi:
While contests are usually analyzed as all-pay, winner-pay contests have been analyzed in Skaper-
das and Gan (1995), Wärneryd (2000) and Yates (2007). There is also a large literature on the
rst-price (sealed bid) auction which constitutes the extreme case of a winner-pay contest in
which the highest bidder wins with probability one.
The timing is as follows. In an all-pay contest contenders exert e¤ort in the rst stage
(simultaneously), while the administrator assigns win probabilities or shares of the prize in the
second stage. In a winner-pay contest contenders promise e¤ort in the rst stage (simultaneously)
but e¤ort is not exerted yet. In the second stage the organizer determines the outcome of the
contest. In the third stage the winner exerts the e¤orts promised.7 When contestants play
mixed strategies, in stage 1 contestants anticipate the CSF and choose a mixed strategy. Then
the actual e¤ort levels are realized and the organizer observes them. In stage two the organizer
chooses (given the realization of e¤orts) the CSF which is the one contestants have anticipated
in stage 1.
among bids.
7Our approach also works if in the rst stage contestants exert e¤ort sequentially (in the case of the all-pay
contest) or promise e¤ort sequentially (in the case of the winner-pay contest). We assume that in a winner-pay
contest the promise of e¤ort in stage one will be fullled in stage three. A reason for this could be that the prize
will only be delivered when e¤ort has been exerted.
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3 Rationalizability in Mixed-Strategies
In this section we formalize the idea that the contest organizers choice in the second stage is
optimal from her view point. Suppose that, after e¤ort has been exerted or promised in the
rst stage, the decider assigns win probabilities or shares of the prize maximizing her objective
function. Since there is no uncertainty and contestants know the organizer and her incentives,
rent-seekers are able to anticipate in the rst stage which CSF will be chosen.
We capture the idea that a particular CSF, which is used when contestants make their
e¤ort choices, is also optimal from the point of view of the contest organizer with the following
denition. Denote by Sn the n  1 dimensional simplex.
Denition 1 The contest success function p(G) = (p1(G); p2(G):::; pn(G)) is rationalizable in
mixed-strategies if there is a function W (p;G) such that for all G 2 Rn,
p(G) = argmax W (p;G), p 2 Sn.
Here the term mixed-strategies refers to the fact that technically a CSF is a probability
distribution even though, as we have already mentioned, it might be interpreted as shares of the
prize. In our approach, the contest success function is the best reply of a contest organizer with
payo¤ function W (p;G). As we will see in the sequel, the payo¤ function allows to take into
account a variety of objectives and attitudes of the decider. The use of mixed-strategies here
might be motivated analogously to the classical argument in favor of mixed-strategies, namely
that mixed-strategies produce unpredictable choices that cannot be exploited by an opponent.
This might translate to enabling the organizer to avoid that contestants forecast perfectly her
choice, which might reduce incentives to exert e¤ort. There are, however, di¤erences between our
approach and the way mixed-strategies are usually employed. Usually a player chooses a mixed-
strategy when she is indi¤erent between the pure strategies involved. In contrast, we will be
able to derive mixed-strategies which are strictly preferred to any other pure or mixed-strategy.
This is because our planners are not expected utility maximizers.
4 Generalized Utilitarian Planner
As commonly assumed in the recent political economy literature (see Grossman and Helpman,
2001; Persson and Tabellini, 2000) let the deciders objective function depend on expected social
welfare.8 Consider a generalized utilitarian planner whose payo¤ function is a constant elasticity
of substitution function
W (p;G) =
8>>>><>>>>:
 
nX
i=1
(ui(pi;G))
1 r
!1=(1 r)
if r 6= 1
nX
i=1
ln (ui(pi;G)) if r = 1
. (4)
8 In that literature the objective function is a weighted average of social welfare and lobbying e¤orts.
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The positive parameter r represents the degree of inequality aversion of the planner. If the CSF
species win probabilities, inequality can be interpreted as referring to expected utility. The
utilitarian case corresponds to r = 0. When r = 1, the Bernoulli-Nash case obtains. When r
goes to innity, the Rawlsian case arises and the concern is with the least well-o¤ only.
We consider an all-pay contest.9 The planner maximizes W (p;G) as dened in (4) with
respect to p. It is instructive to start with the Bernoulli-Nash case in which r = 1.
Proposition 1 Suppose the contest is all-pay and maximizing (4) with respect to p has an
interior solution. The contest success function
pi =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)
n
+Gi=Vi for i = 1; :::; n (5)
is the unique one that can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4) with
r = 1.
Proof. Notice rst that the objective function is strictly concave, as the Hessian matrix is a
diagonal matrix which has as its iith element  (Vi)2=(piVi Gi)2. Since the solution is interior,
the rst order conditions imply
(piVi  Gi)Vj = (pjVj  Gj)Vi; for i; j = 1; :::; n.
Rearranging we obtain
pi =
pnVn  Gn
Vn
+
Gi
Vi
for i = 1; :::; n.
Adding up over all contestants yields
pn =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)
n
+Gn=Vn
and replacing this in the previous equation we obtain (5).
Notice that the expression in (5) is a generalized di¤erence-form. To see this consider the
following corollary.
Corollary 1 Suppose the contest is all-pay and maximizing (4) with respect to p has an interior
solution.
1. If there is a common value V , the contest success function
pi =
1
n
+
1
nV
0@(n  1)Gi  X
j 6=i
Gj
1A for i = 1; :::; n (6)
is the unique one that can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4)
with r = 1.
9We omit the discussion of winner-pay contests as the mathematical structure of the problem is closely related
to Proposition 5. See the discussion after that proposition.
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2. If n = 2, the contest success function
pi =
1
2
+
1
2

Gi
Vi
  Gj
Vj

for i = 1; 2 and j 6= i (7)
is the unique one that can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4)
with r = 1.
Notice that the CSFs in (6) and (7) are very related to the linear di¤erence-form contest in
Che and Gale (2000) given in (3). When there are two contestants and when pi > 0 for i = 1; 2,
then (5) coincides with (3) if there is a common value V and V = 1=(2s). This threshold
V = 1=(2s) has the interesting interpretation that a contestant can only guarantee success by
exerting at least this amount more than the opponent.
As Baik (1998) and Che and Gale (2000) have shown, in many di¤erence-form contests there
are problems concerning the existence of pure strategy equilibria. But, as we already discussed,
our approach can also work when contestants play a mixed-strategy.
We consider now the case in which r 6= 1 and r 2 (0;1).
Proposition 2 Suppose the contest is all-pay and maximizing (4) with respect to p has an
interior solution. The contest success function
pi =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)Xn
j=1
(Vj=Vi)
1 r
r
+Gi=Vi for i = 1; :::; n (8)
is the unique one that can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4) with
r 6= 1 and r 2 (0;1).
Proof. Suppose r 6= 1 and r 2 (0;1) and consider
W 0(p;G) =
nX
i=1
(piVi  Gi)1 r :
Notice that for r < 1, W (p;G) is an increasing transformation of W 0(p;G), while for r > 1,
W (p;G) is a decreasing transformation of W 0(p;G). The Hessian matrix of W 0(p;G) is a
diagonal matrix which has as its iith element  r(1 r)(Vi)2(piVi Gi) r 1. W 0(p;G) is, hence,
strictly concave for r < 1 and strictly convex for r > 1. W 0(p;G) has thus a unique maximizer
in the rst case and a unique minimizer in the latter case. Both correspond to the unique
maximizer of W (p;G).
Let us maximize W 0(p;G) as dened above subject to p 2 Sn, where Sn is the n   1
dimensional simplex. Since the solution is interior, the rst order conditions imply
(piVi  Gi)r Vj = (pjVj  Gj)r Vi; for i; j = 1; :::; n.
Rearranging we obtain
pi =
pnVn  Gn
(Vn)
1=r
(Vi)
1 r
r +
Gi
Vi
for i = 1; :::; n.
6
Adding up over all contestants yields
pn =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)Xn
j=1
(Vj)
1 r
r
(Vn)
1 r
r +Gn=Vn
and replacing this in the previous equation we obtain (8).
Notice that when r goes to one, (8) becomes (5), while when there is a common value (8)
becomes (6). Consider now the Rawlsian case in which r goes to innity.
Proposition 3 Suppose the contest is all-pay and maximizing (4) with respect to p has an
interior solution. The contest success function
pi =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)Xn
j=1
Vi=Vj
+Gi=Vi for i = 1; :::; n (9)
is the unique one that can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4) with
r =1.
Proof. For r equal to innity the objective function (4) becomes
W (p;G) = minfp1V1  G1; :::; pnVn  Gng: (10)
If the solution is interior, it must hold that
piVi  Gi = pjVj  Gj ; for i; j = 1; :::; n.
This implies that
pi =
pnVn  Gn
Vi
+
Gi
Vi
for i = 1; :::; n.
Adding up over all contestants yields
pn =
1 
Xn
j=1
(Gj=Vj)Xn
j=1
1=Vj
(Vn)
 1 +Gn=Vn
and replacing this in the previous equation we obtain (9).
Notice that when r goes to innity, (8) becomes (9). Note also that when there is a common
value all cases considered so far yield the same CSF.
Corollary 2 Suppose the contest is all-pay, maximizing (4) with respect to p has an interior
solution and there is a common value. The contest success function (6) is the unique one that
can be rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (4) with r > 0.
We may also consider an individual rationality constraint in the planners problem adding
the restrictions that ui  0; i = 1; 2; :::; n. Notice that in the cases considered in Propositions 1,
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2 and 3 as long as
Xn
j=1
Gj=Vj  1 it can be easily shown that there is a subset of the simplex
from which win probabilities can be chosen such that the individual rationality constraint is
satised. Note also that in the case of a common value the assumption that the sum of individual
e¤orts weighted by the valuation must be smaller than one says that the rent is not completely
dissipated. The assumption that
Xn
j=1
Gj=Vj  1 together with Gi=Vi > 0; i = 1; 2; :::; n is
also su¢ cient to guarantee that maximizing (4) with respect to p has an interior solution. On
the one hand, it is immediate that under these assumptions pi > 0, i = 1; 2; :::; n. On the other
hand, computing the sum of the win probabilities using (8) shows that
Xn
j=1
pj = 1. Thus, we
have that pi 2 (0; 1); i = 1; 2; :::; n. This shows that our interiority assumption can be satised
under certain conditions.
Finally let us consider the case of r = 0 in which the planner is utilitarian. In this case,
in general, there will be no interior solution and the assignment of win probabilities depends
only on valuations. More precisely, the planner prefers that the contestant with the highest
valuation wins the prize. In the common value case the objective function of the planner becomes
insensitive to whom wins the contest.
Proposition 4 Suppose the contest is all-pay and W (p;G) follows (4) with r = 0. The contest
success function is such that the contestant with the highest valuation wins the prize: If pi > 0,
then Vi = maxfV1; V2; :::; Vng.
5 Other Approaches
Suppose that the prize is the right to supply a certain good (i.e. Olympic Games) and that
the quality of this good is positively related with the e¤ort made by the winner. Let fi(Gi) be
the quality of the prize if agent i wins the contest. Then, expected quality, identied with the
utility of the planner is W (p;G) =
Xn
i=i
pifi(G). Since expected utility theory has a linear
structure similar to the utilitarian planner of the previous section, imperfectly discriminating
CSFs cannot be rationalized.10 This is illustrated by the following example.
Example 1 Incumbency advantage (Konrad (2002)). Let the contest be winner-pay and n = 2.
Assume f1(G1) = G1 and f2(G2) = bG2  a, where b 2 (0; 1] and a  0. When a = 0 and b = 1,
this function rationalizes the standard rst-price (sealed bid) auction in mixed-strategies. For
other parameter values it rationalizes a biased version of it.
10 It is also di¢ cult to derive imperfectly discriminating CSFs using expected utility theory when the contest is
all-pay. Suppose the organizer obtains fi(G) =
X
n
j=1Gj no matter which contestant wins, then the organizers
payo¤s do not depend on the assignment rule. The organizer is, thus, indi¤erent between CSFs and any rule
including imperfectly discriminating ones can be rationalized in mixed-strategies. But notice that fi(G) does
not need to be the same for all i, in which case imperfectly discriminating CSFs cannot be generated. To see
this assume that p(G) is imperfectly discriminating and p(G) can be rationalized in mixed-strategies. Then
there exist G^ 2 Rn++ and i; j 2 N such that fi(G^) > fj(G^) and maximizing W (p; G^) requires fj(G^) = 0. This
contradicts that p(G) is imperfectly discriminating.
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In order to derive imperfectly discriminating CSFs one needs thus to assume some form of
non-expected utility theory.
Consider prospect theory. A prospect is an utility level fi(Gi), which we identify with the
quality of the prize, and a probability pi. In prospect theory the former is transformed through
a value function, while the latter enters the utility through a weighting function. Both functions
are assumed to be power functions.11
More precisely, consider the following functional form for W (p;G) which corresponds to
a special case of the class postulated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979, p. 276) for regular
prospects, namely12
W (p;G) =
nX
i=1
pi fi(Gi)
1 , 1 >  > 0. (11)
Notice that (11) is the sum of n terms one associated to each contestant. In each such term
both components of a prospect are combined in a Cobb-Douglas way under the assumption of
constant returns to scale.
Finally, all these contestantsspecic CobbDouglas functions are aggregated in an additive
way. This reects that contestants are perfect substitutes from the contest organizers point
of view and implies that the marginal product of a contestants e¤ort does not depend on the
e¤ort of others. Notice lastly that except for the contestantsspecic fi()s, (11) is symmetric
in contestants. For example, the exponents  and 1   , which measure the elasticity of the
contest organizers payo¤ with respect to e¤ort and win probability, take the same value for
every participant. Moreover, there is no contestantsspecic scaling parameter. Now we have
the following result:
Proposition 5 The contest success function of the form (2) is the unique one that can be
rationalized in mixed-strategies by a function fullling (11).
Proof. Let us maximize W (p;G), p 2 S. Since W (p;G) is continuous on p and S is
compact, a maximum exists. Since W (p;G) is strictly concave on p and S is convex the
maximum is unique. Consider the rst order conditions of the maximization with respect to p
p 1i fi(Gi)
1     = 0, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Clearly, the maximum is interior because if pi ! 0, the left hand side of the above equation goes
to innity. The above equations imply that
p 1i fi(Gi)
1  = p 1j fj(Gj)
1 , i; j = 1; 2; :::; n.
11Value functions in the form of power functions are often used. For a discussion and axiomatic analysis of the
so-called probability weighting functions, including the power function employed in (11), see Prelec (1998). Of
course, an important di¤erence between our setting and standard applications of prospect theory is that here win
probabilities are an object of choice of the decider.
12Although Kahneman and Tversky consider n = 2, they consider the extension to more outcomes straight-
forward(p. 288).
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Which yield
pi =
fi(Gi)pn
fn(Gn)
, i = 1; 2; :::; n.
Substituting these equations in the simplex we obtain that
pn =
fn(Gn)
nX
j=1
fj(Gj)
.
Substituting this equation in the previous one we obtain (2).
Notice that besides prospect theory there might be other interpretations of (11) that de-
pending on the context might be meaningful. For instance, by choosing fi(Gi) = (Gi)

1  and
by applying to (11) the increasing transformation V (p;G) = (W (p;G))1=, we obtain the CES
utility function with the form
V (p;G) =
 
nX
i=1
(piGi)

!1=
with  = 1  1

, (12)
where  is the elasticity of substitution which is usually assumed to be strictly larger than one.
Since the maximizer is not a¤ected, we obtain pi = (Gi)
 1 =
0@ nX
j=1
(Gj)
 1
1A, which allows to
explain the exponents in this CSF as the elasticity of substitution of the decider.13 In another
example one might proceed similarly and choose fi(Gi) = (Vi Gi)

1  . This corresponds to (4)
under the assumption of a winner pay contest.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have shown that contest success functions can be viewed as optimal choices of a contest
organizer, given e¤orts of contestants. This implies that it is not necessary to assume that a
contest organizer is able to commit to employ a given contest success function. This approach
does not rely on uncertainty or reputation e¤ects. We have shown that our approach works
both for all-pay and winner-pay contests. It can also motivate both interpretations of contest
success functions: win probabilities and shares of the prize. Our exercise yields contest success
functions that were already popularproviding new support for them.
Notice that the our approach is very much related to at least two classic problems.
13Under the assumption that the CSF assigns shares of the prize, the CES function indicates a taste for variety.
A politician might have a taste for variety when the lobbying e¤orts are based on di¤erent expertise e.g. when
they are used to draft legislation. One interpretation of equation (12) is then that lobbies o¤er to invest e¤ort Gi
in drafting a complete bill and that the decider prefers to have parts of the legislation drafted by di¤erent lobbies.
Notice that in order to capture a taste for variety the sum in equation (12) cannot be linear in shares, because 
nX
i=1
pi (G)

!1=
> G requires  < 1.
10
The rst classic problem is the equivalence between revealed preference and utility maxi-
mizing choices. For a long time our profession struggled to nd a condition under which these
two approaches were equivalent, a nal solution being obtained by Kihlstrom, Mas-Colell and
Sonnenschein (1976). In our case we show the equivalence between contest success functions
whose axiomatic properties were known and those arising from the actions of a benevolent and
well-informed planner.
The second classic problem is the equivalence between market equilibrium and welfare opti-
mum, i.e. the so-called two fundamental theorems of welfare economics. These theorems assert
the equivalence between market equilibrium and allocations obtained by a benevolent and well-
informed planner, see Mas-Colell (1985 and 1986). In our case, we nd that some contest success
functions maximize expected social welfare. As in the case of the two fundamental theorems of
welfare economics we do not mean that the planner actually exists. The planner is just a surro-
gate of what the system achieves by its own forces. Thus, in our case, contest success functions
can be determined by the pure form of conict, random elements, etc. What our results say is
what these contest success functions are like if they were chosen by a planner (with a visible
hand) in order to maximize social welfare.
An interesting implication of our analysis is that contest success functions might depend
on the valuations of contestants. This is reasonable when the decider takes into account the
welfare e¤ects of her decision on contestants which in a contest model depend on valuations. In
this sense our analysis bridges the gap between the contest literature and the recent literature
on political economy in which the decider takes into account the welfare of rent-seekers (see
Grossman and Helpman (2001)).
By postulating reasonable aims for the decider we have derived commonly used contest
success functions and new ones with a mathematical structure similar to popular ones. Future
research might postulate further payo¤ functions for the contest organizer and investigate the
consequences for the contest success functions which arise.
In contrast, in the contest literature many studies suppose that the contest organizer is only
interested in maximizing total expected e¤ort. But as Konrad (2007, p. 69) writes this is,
at best, an approximation to what contest organizers care about in many applications.In the
present paper we have postulated alternative aims for the contest organizer and shown how
these aims translate into contest success functions. We hope that our approach opens the door
to taking into account further variables inuencing contest organizers.
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